Summary:
* Adds a `SELF_HYPERLINK()` python function, with optional keyword arguments to set a label, the page, and link parameters.
* Adds a `UUID()` python function, since using python's uuid.uuidv4 hits a problem accessing /dev/urandom in the sandbox. UUID makes no particular quality claims since it doesn't use an audited implementation. A difficult to guess code is convenient for some use cases that `SELF_HYPERLINK()` enables.
The canonical URL for a document is mutable, but older versions generally forward. So for implementation simplicity the document url is passed it on sandbox creation and remains fixed throughout the lifetime of the sandbox. This could and should be improved in future.
The URL is passed into the sandbox as a `DOC_URL` environment variable.
The code for creating the URL is factored out of `Notifier.ts`. Since the url is a function of the organization as well as the document, some rejiggering is needed to make that information available to DocManager.
On document imports, the new document is registered in the database slightly earlier now, in order to keep the procedure for constructing the URL in different starting conditions more homogeneous.
Test Plan: updated test
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2759
Summary:
This improves support for access control on document modifications. It adds:
* Checking of create/remove/update access for row-level changes.
* Use of `newRec` variable in formulas.
It is now possible to have distinct clients with read+write access to different rows of the same table.
This is another incremental step. There are deficiencies in actions that include schema changes, and many other lacunae. But the overall flow is taking shape.
Access control is done at the DocAction level, requiring the sandbox to process the UserActions, and then be reverted if the action proves unlawful. This could be optimized away in many simple and important cases, but I'm not sure it is possible to avoid in general.
Test Plan: added tests
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2677
Summary:
This is a prototype for expanding the conditions that can be used in granular ACLs.
When processing ACLs, the following variables (called "characteristics") are now available in conditions:
* UserID
* Email
* Name
* Access (owners, editors, viewers)
The set of variables can be expanded by adding a "characteristic" clause. This is a clause which specifies:
* A tableId
* The name of an existing characteristic
* A colId
The effect of the clause is to expand the available characteristics with all the columns in the table, with values taken from the record where there is a match between the specified characteristic and the specified column.
Existing clauses are generalized somewhat to demonstrate and test the use these variables. That isn't the main point of this diff though, and I propose to leave generalizing+systematizing those clauses for a future diff.
Issues I'm not dealing with here:
* How clauses combine. (The scope on GranularAccessRowClause is a hack to save me worrying about that yet).
* The full set of matching methods we'll allow.
* Refreshing row access in clients when the tables mentioned in characteristic tables change.
* Full CRUD permission control.
* Default rules (part of combination).
* Reporting errors in access rules.
That said, with this diff it is possible to e.g. assign a City to editors by their email address or name, and have only rows for those Cities be visible in their client. Ability to modify those rows, and remain updates about them, remains under incomplete control.
Test Plan: added tests
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2642
Summary:
This makes it possible to serve a table or tables only to owners.
* The _grist_ACLResources table is abused (temporarily) such that rows of the form `{colId: '~o', tableId}` are interpreted as meaning that `tableId` is private to owners.
* Many websocket and api endpoints are updated to preserve the privacy of these tables.
* In a document where some tables are private, a lot of capabilities are turned off for non-owners to avoid leaking info indirectly.
* The client is tweaked minimally, to show '-' where a page with some private material would otherwise go.
No attempt is made to protect data from private tables pulled into non-private tables via formulas.
There are some known leaks remaining:
* Changes to the schema of private tables are still broadcast to all clients (fixable).
* Non-owner may be able to access snapshots or make forks or use other corners of API (fixable).
* Changing name of table makes it public, since tableId in ACLResource is not updated (fixable).
Security will require some work, the attack surface is large.
Test Plan: added tests
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2604
Summary: This makes the user's role (owner/editor/viewer) available in ActiveDoc methods. No use of that information is made yet, other than to log it. The bulk of the diff is getting a handle on the various ways the methods can be called, and systematizing it a bit more. In passing, access control is added to broadcasts of document changes, so users who no longer have access to a document do not receive changes if they still have the document open.
Test Plan: existing tests pass; test for broadcast access control added
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2599
Summary: This moves enough server material into core to run a home server. The data engine is not yet incorporated (though in manual testing it works when ported).
Test Plan: existing tests pass
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2552
