Summary:
This implements a form of row-level access control where for a
given table, you may specify that only owners have access to
rows for which a given column has falsy values.
For simplicity:
* Only owners may edit that table.
* Non-owners with the document open will have forced
reloads whenever the table is modified.
Baby steps...
Test Plan: added tests
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2633
Summary:
AccessRules class that implements that UI is intended to look vaguely like
detailed rules might look in the future, but only supports the very limited set
we have now.
In addition, UserManager and BillingPage code is separated into their own webpack bundles, to reduce the sizes of primary bundles, and relevant code from them is loaded asynchronously.
Also add two TableData methods: filterRowIds() and findMatchingRowId().
Test Plan: Only tested manually, proper automated tests don't seem warranted for this temporary UI.
Reviewers: paulfitz
Reviewed By: paulfitz
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2620
Summary:
This is an incremental step in granular access control. Using
a temporary `{colIds: '~o structure'}` representation in the
`_grist_ACLResources` table, the document structure can be set
to be controlled by owners only.
Test Plan: added test
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2613
Summary:
This makes it possible to serve a table or tables only to owners.
* The _grist_ACLResources table is abused (temporarily) such that rows of the form `{colId: '~o', tableId}` are interpreted as meaning that `tableId` is private to owners.
* Many websocket and api endpoints are updated to preserve the privacy of these tables.
* In a document where some tables are private, a lot of capabilities are turned off for non-owners to avoid leaking info indirectly.
* The client is tweaked minimally, to show '-' where a page with some private material would otherwise go.
No attempt is made to protect data from private tables pulled into non-private tables via formulas.
There are some known leaks remaining:
* Changes to the schema of private tables are still broadcast to all clients (fixable).
* Non-owner may be able to access snapshots or make forks or use other corners of API (fixable).
* Changing name of table makes it public, since tableId in ACLResource is not updated (fixable).
Security will require some work, the attack surface is large.
Test Plan: added tests
Reviewers: dsagal
Reviewed By: dsagal
Differential Revision: https://phab.getgrist.com/D2604
