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(core) updates from grist-core

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This commit is contained in:
Paul Fitzpatrick
2024-03-18 09:14:25 -04:00
parent 2ebf350bdf 0c58d40f39
commit 48a8af83fc
10 changed files with 65 additions and 46 deletions
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4
app/server/lib/Authorizer.ts
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import {makeId} from 'app/server/lib/idUtils';
import log from 'app/server/lib/log';
import {IPermitStore, Permit} from 'app/server/lib/Permit';
import {AccessTokenInfo} from 'app/server/lib/AccessTokens';
import {allowHost, getOriginUrl, isEnvironmentAllowedHost, optStringParam} from 'app/server/lib/requestUtils';
import {allowHost, getOriginUrl, optStringParam} from 'app/server/lib/requestUtils';
import * as cookie from 'cookie';
import {NextFunction, Request, RequestHandler, Response} from 'express';
import {IncomingMessage} from 'http';
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ export async function addRequestUser(
// custom-domain owner could hijack such sessions.
const allowedOrg = getAllowedOrgForSessionID(mreq.sessionID);
if (allowedOrg) {
if (allowHost(req, allowedOrg.host) || isEnvironmentAllowedHost(allowedOrg.host)) {
if (allowHost(req, allowedOrg.host)) {
customHostSession = ` custom-host-match ${allowedOrg.host}`;
} else {
// We need an exception for internal forwarding from home server to doc-workers. These use

16
app/server/lib/requestUtils.ts
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import {RequestWithGrist} from 'app/server/lib/GristServer';
import log from 'app/server/lib/log';
import {Permit} from 'app/server/lib/Permit';
import {Request, Response} from 'express';
import _ from 'lodash';
import {Writable} from 'stream';
// log api details outside of dev environment (when GRIST_HOSTED_VERSION is set)
@@ -87,7 +86,7 @@ export function trustOrigin(req: Request, resp: Response): boolean {
const origin = req.get('origin');
if (!origin) { return true; } // Not a CORS request.
if (process.env.GRIST_HOST && req.hostname === process.env.GRIST_HOST) { return true; }
if (!allowHost(req, new URL(origin)) && !isEnvironmentAllowedHost(new URL(origin))) { return false; }
if (!allowHost(req, new URL(origin))) { return false; }
// For a request to a custom domain, the full hostname must match.
resp.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin);
@@ -104,14 +103,14 @@ export function allowHost(req: Request, allowedHost: string|URL) {
const allowedUrl = (typeof allowedHost === 'string') ? new URL(`${proto}://${allowedHost}`) : allowedHost;
if (mreq.isCustomHost) {
// For a request to a custom domain, the full hostname must match.
return actualUrl.hostname === allowedUrl.hostname;
return actualUrl.hostname === allowedUrl.hostname;
} else {
// For requests to a native subdomains, only the base domain needs to match.
const allowedDomain = parseSubdomain(allowedUrl.hostname);
const actualDomain = parseSubdomain(actualUrl.hostname);
return (!_.isEmpty(actualDomain) ?
return actualDomain.base ?
actualDomain.base === allowedDomain.base :
allowedUrl.hostname === actualUrl.hostname);
actualUrl.hostname === allowedUrl.hostname;
}
}
@@ -119,13 +118,6 @@ export function matchesBaseDomain(domain: string, baseDomain: string) {
return domain === baseDomain || domain.endsWith("." + baseDomain);
}
export function isEnvironmentAllowedHost(url: string|URL) {
const urlHost = (typeof url === 'string') ? url : url.hostname;
return (process.env.GRIST_ALLOWED_HOSTS || "").split(",").some(domain =>
domain && matchesBaseDomain(urlHost, domain)
);
}
export function isParameterOn(parameter: any): boolean {
return gutil.isAffirmative(parameter);
}