import {FlexServer} from 'app/server/lib/FlexServer'; import * as log from 'app/server/lib/log'; import {PluginManager} from 'app/server/lib/PluginManager'; import * as express from 'express'; import * as mimeTypes from 'mime-types'; import * as path from 'path'; // Get the url where plugin material should be served from. export function getUntrustedContentOrigin(): string|undefined { return process.env.APP_UNTRUSTED_URL; } // Get the host serving plugin material export function getUntrustedContentHost(): string|undefined { const origin = getUntrustedContentOrigin(); if (!origin) { return; } return new URL(origin).host; } // Add plugin endpoints to be served on untrusted host export function addPluginEndpoints(server: FlexServer, pluginManager: PluginManager) { const host = getUntrustedContentHost(); if (host) { server.app.get(/^\/plugins\/(installed|builtIn)\/([^/]+)\/(.+)/, (req, res) => servePluginContent(req, res, pluginManager, host)); } } // Serve content for plugins with various checks that it is being accessed as we expect. function servePluginContent(req: express.Request, res: express.Response, pluginManager: PluginManager, untrustedContentHost: string) { const pluginKind = req.params[0]; const pluginId = req.params[1]; const pluginPath = req.params[2]; // We should not serve untrusted content (as from plugins) from the same domain as the main app // (at least not html pages), as it's an open door to XSS attacks. // - For hosted version, we serve it from a separate domain name. // - For electron version, we give access to protected content based on a special header. // - We also allow "application/javascript" content from the main domain for serving the // WebWorker main script, since that's hard to distinguish in electron case, and should not // enable XSS. if (matchHost(req.get('host'), untrustedContentHost) || req.get('X-From-Plugin-WebView') === "true" || mimeTypes.lookup(path.extname(pluginPath)) === "application/javascript") { const dirs = pluginManager.dirs(); const contentRoot = pluginKind === "installed" ? dirs.installed : dirs.builtIn; // Note that pluginPath may not be safe, but `sendFile` with the "root" option restricts // relative paths to be within the root folder (see the 3rd party library unit-test: // https://github.com/pillarjs/send/blob/3daa901cf731b86187e4449fa2c52f971e0b3dbc/test/send.js#L1363) return res.sendFile(`${pluginId}/${pluginPath}`, {root: contentRoot}); } log.warn(`Refusing to serve untrusted plugin content on ${req.get('host')}`); res.status(403).end('Plugin content is not accessible to this request'); } // Middleware to restrict some assets to untrusted host. export function limitToPlugins(handler: express.RequestHandler) { const host = getUntrustedContentHost(); return function(req: express.Request, resp: express.Response, next: express.NextFunction) { if (!host) { return next(); } if (matchHost(req.get('host'), host) || req.get('X-From-Plugin-WebView') === "true") { return handler(req, resp, next); } return next(); }; } // Compare hosts, bearing in mind that if they happen to be on port 443 the // port number may or may not be included. This assumes we are serving over https. function matchHost(host1: string|undefined, host2: string) { if (!host1) { return false; } if (host1 === host2) { return true; } if (host1.indexOf(':') === -1) { host1 += ":443"; } if (host2.indexOf(':') === -1) { host2 += ":443"; } return host1 === host2; }